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Abstract
The prevention of credit card fraud is an important ap-
plication for prediction techniques. One major  obstacle
for using neural network training techniques is the high
necessary  diagnostic  quality:  Since  only  one  financial
transaction of a thousand is invalid no prediction success
less than 99.9%  is acceptable.
Due  to  these  credit  card  transaction  proportions
complete new concepts had to be developed and tested on
real credit card data.  This  paper  shows  how  advanced
data  mining  techniques  and  neural  network  algorithm
can be combined successfully to obtain a high fraud cov-
erage combined with  a low false alarm rate.
1  Introduction
The prediction of user behavior in financial systems
can  be used in many situations. Predicting client migra-
tion,  marketing  or  public  relations  can  save  a  lot  of
money and other resources. One of the most interesting
fields of prediction is the fraud of credit lines, especially
credit card payments. In our case, for the high data traffic
of 400,000 transactions per day with the fraud of 10 mil-
lion $ per year, a reduction of 10% of fraud triggers  a
saving  of  one  million  of  dollars  per  year.  The  goal  is
clear: How can we save this money?
Certainly, all transactions which deal with accounts of
known fraud are not authorized. Nevertheless, there are
transactions  which  are  formally  valid,  but  experienced
people can tell that these transactions are probably mis-
used, caused by stolen cards or fake merchants. So, the
task is to avoid a fraud by a credit card transaction before
it is known as “illegal”.
With an increasing number of transactions people can
no longer control all of them. As remedy, one may catch
the  experience  of  the  experts  and  put  it  into  an  expert
system.  This  traditional  approach  has  the  disadvantage
that  the  expert’s  knowledge,  even  when  it  can  be  ex-
tracted explicitly, changes rapidly with new kinds of or-
ganized attacks and patterns of credit card fraud. In order
to keep track with this, no predefined fraud models as in
[7] but automatic learning algorithms are needed.
This  paper  deals  with the  problems  specific  to  this
special data mining application and tries to solve them by
a combined probabilistic and neuro-adaptive approach for
a given data base of credit card transactions of the GZS.
1.1  The goal of fraud detection
The objective of the diagnosis can be formulated by the
commonly used diagnostic scheme shown in Table 1.
Data\diagnosis legal fraud
legal P(correct|legal) P(false
alarm|legal)
fraud P(fraud not detected) P(correct|fraud)
Table 1 The outcome probability table
A high correct diagnostic probability
     P(correct) = P(correct | fraud) P(fraud) + (1.1)
           P(correct | legal) P(legal)
can be obtained by minimizing the (generally weighted)
sum
R = r1 P(fraud not det.) + r2 P(false alarm|legal) 
(1.2)
Our objective function R to be minimized is determined
by the costs r1,r2 which are implied by the wrong deci-
sions. In practice, r1 and r2 are difficult to determine ex-
actly. Therefore, we focus on minimizing the false alarm
rate and the probability of not detected fraud at the same
time.  In  principal,  we  are  aiming  for  maximizing  the
number  of  fraud  transactions  correctly  recognized  and
minimizing the number of false alarms in order to mini-
mize the fraud costs.
For the false alarm rate FAR we know that
FAR =  alarms   all #
alarms   false # ³ alarms   all #
alarms   false #
legals   all #
alarms   all #
=  legals   all #
alarms   false #  = P(false alarm|legal) (1.3)because 1³ legals   all #
alarms   all # in most cases.
As we will see later, the false alarm rate is very sensitive
for  diagnostic  changes  whereas  the  probability  of  de-
tected fraud is subject to smaller changes. Thus, we con-
centrate on minimizing the FAR = P(false alarm) while
maintaining an acceptable high level of P(correct|fraud).
1.2  Modeling the data
The transaction data are characterized by some very spe-
cial proportions:
·  The  probability  of  a  fraud  transaction  is  very  low
(0.2%) and has been lowered in a preprocessing step
by  a  conventional  fraud  detecting  system  down  to
0.1%.
·  Most of the 38 data fields (about 26 fields) per trans-
action  contain  symbolic  data  as  merchant  code,  ac-
count number, client name etc.
·  A  symbolic  field  can  contain as  low  as  two  values
(e.g.  the  kind  of  credit  card) up to  several  hundred
thousand values (as the merchant code).
·  The  confidence  limit  for  a  transaction abort is  very
subjective  and  subject  to  client  policy.  Transactions
with a confidence for fraud of higher than 10% are
accepted to be revised or aborted.
These data proportions have several implications. For the
very low fraud occurrence of only 0.1% a constant, “stu-
pid” diagnosis of “transaction is no fraud” for all transac-
tions will have a success rate of P(correct) = 99.9%. All
adaptive  fraud  diagnosis  which  has  lower  success  than
this 99.9% (e.g. [3] with 92.5% or [9] with 50%) is ques-
tionable. The outcome probability Table 1 becomes
Data\diagnosis legal fraud
legal 100% 0%
fraud 100% 0%
Table 2  The outcome probability table of the con-
stant diagnosis
1.3  Preprocessing the data
One of the most tedious operations is the normalization of
the data. For half a million transactions of a sample inter-
val which we analyzed we used the following operations:
¨  All data can be (but must not be) produced by the
chain transaction authorization request – transaction
authorization – transaction fraud claim. In order to
produce  just  one  transaction  record,  all  different
transactions  of  one  account  concerning  the  same
money transfer must be merged to one record. Trans-
actions which reflect only status changes (as credit
limit changes, etc.) are sorted out.
¨  Additionally,  the resulting  5,850  fraud  transactions
and 542,858 legal transactions are ordered by their
time stamps.
¨  Then,  the  ASCII  data  values  of  the  symbolic  raw
data are converted into enumerated data entries. For
non-available  transaction  features  special  symbols
are used.
All these operations resulted in our normalized data base
of fixed records of numbers and no text.
2  Mining the symbolic data
The  task  of  recognizing  the  transactions  with  fraud  is
very demanding. One idea is learning the  feature  asso-
ciations  for  credit  fraud.  In  neural  network  literature,
there are several models of learning association rules by
associative  memory.  Let  us  consider  the  most  popular
one,  the  correlation  matrix  memory  [5],  and  show  its
problems for our application. After this, we will deduce
an alternative learning model.
2.1  Modeling associations by binary associative
memory
Let us combine all symbolic features xk of one transac-
tion  in  one  data  tuple  x  =  (x1,...,xn).  Here,  we  encode
every  feature  such that it  consists  only  of  binary  vari-
ables.  For  example,  take  a  four-valued  feature  xkÎ
{a,b,c,d}. This feature may be encoded using a new set of
four binary-valued features xka... xkd, see Fig. 1.
Xk=b
xkÎ {a,b,c,d}
Xka= 0
Xkb= 1
Xkc= 0
Xkd= 0
ì
í
î
Fig. 1 Encoding of a symbolic variable with 4 values
In the figure, for the feature value xk=b the new feature
xkb becomes 1 and all others of the set zero.
Now, each transaction can be associated to a result Mi, a
fraud of type i, by storing the tuple (x, Mi) in a binary
associative memory. The complete associative device is
shown in Fig. 2.
Without going into details (see [10],[5]), the learning rule
updates the association weights (shown as thick dots in
Fig.  2).  On  input  of  a  transaction  tuple  an  association
between a fraud Mj and an input tuple x is triggered and
the output Mj becomes 1.W
M
M1 Mp M2
· · ·
x1
x2
·
 ·
 ·
xn
Fig. 2  A binary associative memory structure yields the
associations (x1 xn M2) and (x1 x2 Mp)
The  regular  binary  encoding  yields  a  very  regular
scheme, using a fixed threshold for the associative read-
out operation.
This approach has several flaws:
·  The  input-output  mapping,  the  association,  is  not
weighted internally. This means that a fraud associa-
tion can be triggered either by several different trans-
actions with different  occurrence  probabilities  or  by
just one. This situation is not adequately reflected by
the device, not even by weighting the output.
·  For features with very many possible values (e.g. sev-
eral hundred thousand ones) the resulting binary in-
puts are encoded very sparsely by just one active in-
put. This means that we have a very large association
matrix W with a very small number of weights. This
is inefficient to implement.
·  The learning (and therefore the network  activity)  of
this model is not based on accurate probabilities of the
input, but on quite arbitrary learning rates.
·  The “unlearning”, i.e. the change of probabilities, is
not reflected in the learning mechanism.
·  There is no generalization mechanism defined in or-
der  to  reduce  the  dependence  of  an  association  on
unimportant input.
Let us consider all theses problems and try to modify our
model according to the needs.
First, the inefficient implementation can be overcome
by treating all transactions as association rules and store
them as they  are. This  avoids  the necessity  of  wasting
huge amounts of memory for zeros. Special learning rules
will reflect the necessity for change and adaptation to the
probabilities of reality.
Nevertheless, the necessity for generalization, impor-
tance and probability weighting still remains.
2.2  Generalizing and weighting the association
rules
The fraud transactions can not be used as fraud rules di-
rectly; they are too special and too many, they have to be
generalized. In contrast to standard basket prediction as-
sociation rules [1], [2], [6] our goal does not consist of
generating  long associating rules  but  of  shortening  our
raw associations by generalizing them to the most com-
mon types of transactions. Additionally, we do not have
binary features but features with multiple possible values.
The  excessive  number  of  possible  values  of  some  fea-
tures prohibits a mapping to new binary features as al-
ready mentioned for the binary associative memory. Al-
though  generalizations  are  common  for  symbolic  AI,
there are no standard algorithms in data mining to do this.
For instance, all algorithms which compute all possible
generalizations and then select only those rules according
to some strategy [1],  [2],  [6]  which  fits  the  data  suffi-
ciently can not be used, because the set of all generaliza-
tions is too big in our case.
Now,  how  can  such  a  generalization  be  done?  We
start with the data base of fraud transactions and compare
each transaction with all others in order to find pairs of
similar ones. Each pair is then merged into a generalized
rule  by  replacing  a  non-identical  feature  by  a  ‘don’t-
care’-symbol ‘*’. By doing so, a generalization process
evolves, see Fig. 3. Here, the generalization of two trans-
actions with the feature tuples x1 = (F,D,C,D,A) and x2 =
(F,D,G,D,A) (dotted circle) to the rule (F,D,*,D,A) and
further up to (F,*,*,D,A) and to (*,*,*,D,*) is shown.
4
th level
3
rd level
2
nd level
1
st
0. FGDDA FDGDA FDCDA CCCDA CCCDG
FD*DA CCCD*
F**DA
***DA
***D*
Fig. 3 The generalization graph
Thus, all raw transactions can be seen as association
rules of level zero; each generalization provides at least
one ‘don’t-care’-symbol for an unimportant  feature, in-
creases the generalization level by one and shortens the
rule  excluding  one  feature.  All  generalizations  which
have not been generalized themselves are the root of a
subgraph, each forming a tree.1 * EA 840 *  *  EM  2768  8403184   *  0 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * N *  *
2 * EA 840 
1)  0  EM    *            *       563  0 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * * *  *
3 * EA 840 *  0   EM  2768 8403184   *   * 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * *002 *
4 * EA 840 * 995 EM     *             *        *   0 1100 * 0 *  0   * * I 
m
n  *  * 0 * * * *  *
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Table 3 Generalized transactions with 16 wildcards
For the example of 5850 fraud data, there are 4 gener-
alized rules  in  level  16  shown in Table  3.  The  feature
names are labeled on the top of the columns. All rules
differ from each other.
In general, there are many rules in a level. What are
the most important ones? Certainly, rules which are often
used are more important than the others.
Thus, the occurrence probability  or the relative number
of transactions which are covered by that rule, the sup-
port, should be high.
support = 
ons  transacti of #
rule   by the   covered   ons  transacti of #    (2.4)
Especially,  we  define the  share  of  a  fraud rule  as  that
relative part of fraud transactions which is covered by the
rule
    share = 
ons  transacti fraud   of #
rule   by the    covered   ons  transacti fraud   of #   (2.5)
Nevertheless, neither the support nor the share reflects the
fact that there are also legal transactions which may fit a
fraud rule and leading to a wrong diagnosis. The more
transactions with a correct diagnosis we have  the more
confidence in the diagnostic process we get. We define
therefore the confidence in a fraud diagnosis as
confidence = 
rule    by  the    covered    ons  transacti of #
rule    by  the    covered   ons  transacti fraud    of #
         = 
alarms   all #
alarms correct     #    (2.6)
With
alarms   all #
alarms correct     #  = 
alarms   all #
alarms   false   #   - alarms   all #
= 1– 
alarms   all #
alarms   false    #  = 1– P(false alarm)
we know with eq. (1.3) that
   confidence = 1– P(false alarm) £ 1–P(false alarm|legal).
Thus, when the confidence is maximized, the probability
of a false alarm is minimized.
For  all  legal  transactions,  each  one  of  the  rules  in
Table 3 has a confidence bigger than 10% and a  share
bigger than 1%. All three measures, preceded by the ab-
solute number of fraud transactions MTA and legal ones
LTA for which they trigger an alarm, are evaluated for
Table 3 and shown in Table 4.
Rule MTA LTA Support Confidence Share
1 690 500 0.011 11.3% 12%
2 78 47 0.001 13.3% 1%
3 267 64 0.004 27.9% 5%
4 42 0 0.001 100% 1%
Table 4  The three importance measures for the exam-
ples in Table 3
Before using the definitions  (2.1)-(2.3) the numbers of
LTA  have  been  adjusted  to  reflect  the  real  proportion
MTA:LTA of 1:1000.
How do the measures defined so far change  by  the
generalization of the rules? We know that the share, the
relative number of fraud transactions covered by a rule,
will increase when we allow more possible  values of a
feature. Thus, the share only increases by generalization,
see the proof in appendix A, theorem 1. Additionally, a
generalization can not increase the confidence, but only
decrease it or be constant. The proof for this is shown in
appendix A, theorem 2.
2.3  Diagnostic implementation issues
The rule based diagnostic system described so far can be
implemented in many different manners. For time critical
applications the diagnostic rules can be stored in conven-
tional  hardware  based  content  addressable  memory
(CAM), implemented for instance with low cost FPGAs
and  yielding  a  runtime  speed  gain  of  50  relative  to  a
software solution. Each time a transaction is fed to the
CAM,  one  or  several  hits  which  eventually  occur  will
indicate a fraud transaction.
Another possible implementation is the conversion of
the parallel decision table (the rules) to a sequential deci-
sion procedure,  i.e. to  a  decision tree, avoiding all not
necessary  comparisons  [4].  In  Fig.  4 a  binary  decision
tree is shown which corresponds to the set of four fraud
detection rules of level 16 shown in of Table 3.
The  alarm is given when one of the rules are fulfilled,
i.e. a exit “M” is reached. Otherwise, the program pro-
ceeds (exit “P”).Yes
Yes
Yes
TRN_TYP = EA
CURR_CD = 840
CRD_TYP = EM
MSG_TYP = 1100
MER_CNTY_CD = 0
ATV_IND = I
ADDR_STAT = 0
ISS_REAS = N
POS_ENT_CD =
ZZUTSZ1UZZZ1
ACCT_STAT = F8
POS_CD1 = 0
ICA_CD  = 2768
FAL_SCOR = 995
AID_CD = 8403184
GEN_CD = 002 ACT_CD = 0
Yes
No
P
M
Yes
Yes
M
P
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
FAL_SCOR = 0
No
No
Yes
P
No
P
Yes
P
P
P
Yes
SIC_CD = 563
FAL_SCOR = 995
M
P
Yes
No
No
P
Fig. 4 The binary decision tree for the rules of Table 3
2.4  The mining algorithm
Now we want to present shortly the algorithm used.
¨  Perform the preprocessing on the data described in
section 1.3.
¨  Perform a data base normalization: Encode  all text
data as binary numbers following the remarks in sec-
tion 1.3.
¨  Now, generalize the transactions to association rules
according  to  the  following  algorithm,  noted  in
pseudo code:
ruleDist:=0; ROWLEN:=27; minShare:=0.02; min-
Conf:=0.1;
CurrList:=AllFraudData; NewList:= empty;
WHILE CurrList.length>0 AND ruleDist<ROWLEN DO
FOR j:=1 TO CurrList.length DO 
  FOR k:=j+1 TO CurrList.length DO
      Generalize (rule[j],rule[k])
  ENDFOR
ENDFOR
ENDWHILE
IF NewList.length = 0
   THEN ruleDist := ruleDist+1
   ELSE ruleDist := 0
ENDIF
Delete marked rules in CurrList;
copy CurrList to the end of NewList;
CurrList := NewList; WriteOut(CurrList);
ENDWHILE
The algorithm scans all the existing rules and compares
them with the other rules. When they have sufficient con-
fidence and share they are stored in a list. If the second
rule has no sufficient confidence but covers an important
part of the misuse data, the subtree of the rule is searched
in order to find a version of the rule which has sufficient
confidence. Once found, the new rule is also stored.
All rules which have been generalized are marked and
deleted for the next level. Marking and deleting does not
destroy  information  because  the  generalized  rule  still
covers all the misuse data with a sufficient level of confi-
dence.
The heart of the algorithm is the generalization. Here,
the procedure merge  generates the new, abstracted rule
by taking a copy of a rule and replacing all features of
one rule which are different to the corresponding ones in
the other rule by wildcard symbols *.
Generalize (rule1,rule2)::=
IF distance(rule1,rule2) ¹ ruleDist THEN RETURN
CurrRule := merge(rule1,rule2)
IF CurrRule NOT IN CurrList or NewList
  THEN
    CurrRule.share:= share(CurrRule)
    CurrRule.conf := conf(CurrRule)
    IF CurrRule.conf > minConf
     THEN insert CurrRule IN NewList
mark(rule1); mark(rule2)
     ELSE
       IF CurrRule.share>minShare THEN
          REPEAT
               NewRule := nextInSubTree(rule2)
               Generalize(rule1,NewRule)
          UNTIL EndOfSubtree
             OR conf(CurrRule)> minConf;
          IF CurrRule.conf < minConf THEN
             REPEAT
               NewRule := nextInSubTree(rule1)
               Generalize(NewRule,rule2)
             UNTIL EndOfSubtree
                OR conf(CurrRule)> minConf;
          ENDIF
ENDIF
    ENDIF
ENDIF
The run time complexity of the algorithm is determined
by the data base of N legal transactions and K fraud ones.
On the first generalization stage, the number of compari-
sons  is  quadratic  in  K  Since  we  have  at  most  K1=(K-
1)
2/2  new  rules,  the  next  generalization  stage  have  to
compare all rules in the set of new rules additionally with
the set of old ones to produce a new rule set of level two.
Thus, in the worst case the number of rules grow expo-
nentially in the generalization level. In reality this is not
the case; with increasing level the total number of rules
drop sharply down to zero, see Fig. 5. The average run
time complexity for rule comparison is therefore domi-
nated by the O(K
2) basic comparisons.
For  the necessary  computation  of  the  share  and  confi-
dence for each generated rule all fraud and legal transac-
tions have to be scanned once. Therefore, we have about
O(K×(K+N)) computation operations.
In  conclusion,  the  algorithm  performs  approximatelyquadratic in K and linear in N.
2.5  Generalization and feature variance
The generalization of two rules into one rule by replacing
one or several features by wildcards may introduce such
an error that the resulting rule has a very low diagnostic
power. This is caused by the fact that the generalization
of the two rules, the wildcard, implies in most cases more
feature values than two. A rule generalized like this will
react not only on all transactions which were detected by
the  first and  the  second  rule,  but  on  other  ones  which
might be erroneous.
What can we do to overcome such a problem? For the
analog  values  we  know  that  a  high  variance  indicates
many deviations of the mean, i.e. many possible values.
For  the  symbolic  feature  values  we  might  use  the  fol-
lowing strategy, based on the probabilities. Since we are
interested in fraud rules which are different to legal trans-
actions, we might compare the statistics of the features of
the fraud data with those of the legal ones using as statis-
tic measure the entropy of the feature. When there are no
preferred  feature  values  in  fraud  transactions,  all  sym-
bolic  values  of  that  feature  have  the  same  occurrence
probability and the entropy will be high, whereas when
some  values  are  preferred,  the  entropy  becomes  low.
Thus, a high symbolic “variance” will be reflected by a
high entropy; a high difference in entropy between fraud
data and  legal  data  will  indicate  an  interesting  feature.
This can be stated in a table:
Legal transaction
/fraud transaction
Small entropy Big entropy
Small entropy Preferred stan-
dard values
Preferred Fraud
values
Big entropy Preferred Legal
values
No preferred
values
Table 5 The feature entropy decision table
In the two cases where some values are preferred, i.e.
the entropy difference is too high, the generalization pro-
cess have to  remember  the  feature  values. Instead  of  a
general wildcard which means the set of all possible val-
ues of this feature, only the set of the feature values of the
generalized transactions is used as generalization at this
place excluding all transactions with other feature values.
Thus,  the  case  where the  presence  of  a  special  feature
value indicates fraud (small fraud entropy) is also covered
like the case where the absence of a feature value always
present in legal transactions (small legal entropy) means
fraud.  Examples  are  the  features  MSG_TYP  and
TRN_TYP for small entropy in fraud transaction and the
feature ICA_CD for small legal entropy.
2.6  Results
It should be noted that the mining algorithm still has a
high  runtime  complexity.  Therefore,  we  used  only  the
5,850 fraud data and 30,000 of the legal transactions. The
resulting values for the confidence were compared to the
whole set of transactions. Interestingly, large differences
(of up to 1000%!) between the results for the sample data
and for the whole data base were observed. For a second
set of 30,000 differently chosen transactions we observed
the  same  phenomena.  Only  the  merge  of  the  two  sets
showed similar values both for this training set and the
test set of all transactions.
In the following Fig. 5 the performance of the rule di-
agnosis is shown as function of the generalization level.
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Fig. 5 The share of the rule based diagnosis
For  each  generalization  level,  i.e.  for  each  number  of
wildcards, a  set  of  active,  non-generalized rules  exists.
They are denoted as “rules per level”. Each set detects a
certain part of the fraud, measured as “share per level”.
We can see that the main part of the share and the rules
are obtained for level 5 and above.
While the share per generalized rule is higher  than  the
share  of  the two  rules  itself,  the number  of  rules  drop
sharply  with  increasing  generalization  level  decreasing
also the total share.
The performance of the fraud rule based diagnostic ma-
chine of level n can be obtained by taking all rule sets of
level n and higher and measure how many fraud attempts
they diagnose and how much share they have, see Fig. 5.
The  confidence  as  a  function  of  the  generalization
level is shown in Fig. 6 .rules per
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Fig. 6 The confidence of the rule levels
We know that a generalization can not increase the confi-
dence, but only decrease it or be constant Nevertheless,
Certainly, the more rules we take the better we perform,
but, the less general the rules are the more the perform-
ance  will  depend  on  statistical  variations  of  the  fraud
data. Considering this trade-off, we might plot the num-
ber of rules versus the percentage of fraud detection for
the 60,000 legal transactions which is shown in Fig. 7 and
try to take a compromise between high share, high confi-
dence and low generality.
200          400          600          800         1000      1200
share
confidence
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
f
r
a
u
d
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
i
n
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
)
Generalization level   6     5     4       3  2  1 0
generalized rules
Fig. 7 The confidence and the share as function of the rules
We can see that a small set of rules, e.g. all rules with
level 5 or higher, offer a good share of ca. 80% with the
double confidence (20%) in fraud diagnosis as demanded.
If we take all the 747 rules from generalization level 4
up to level 17 we obtain a moderate confidence for the
fraud detection on the set of all transactions, see Table 6.
#rules % correct diagnosis confidence
legal fraud total %
747 99.73 90.91 99.64 25.15
(99.72) (25.2)
510 99.97 83.08 99.79 75.17
(99.96) (80.59)
0 99.9 0.0 99.9 0.0
Table 6 Fraud detection vs. confidence
Here, the total correct diagnosis is computed by the basic
proportion (1.1) and the confidence by
conf (fraud diagn.) = ( )
1
p
p 1
N
N
f
l
f
l 1
- - +
with the number of legal data Nl,  the number  of  fraud
data  Nf,  and  the  probabilities  pl  º  P(legal)  and  pf  º
P(fraud).
However, when we select only those rules which also
preserve their confidence sufficiently on the whole trans-
action set, we obtain 510 rules. Certainly, with less rules
the fraud diagnosis probability decreases slightly, but, as
we see in Table 6, the confidence in the diagnosis is dra-
matically increased up to 75 % due to the high proportion
of  legal  data  which are less  misclassified.  This  is  also
true when we use the real proportion for legal vs. misuse
transactions of 1000:1 which are shown in round brackets
in Table 6. The total diagnosis performance is even better
than  the  constant,  “stupid”  diagnosis  mentioned  before
and noted in the last table row.
In  conclusion,  using  the  rule  generalization  mecha-
nism described above we arrive by 25 % of all alarms to
avoid the fraud up to 91% which means a saving  of  9
million $ per year!
Can  this  success  be  increased?  Certainly,  we  still
have a too high degree of false alarms which should be
decreased by additional means. One of them is to include
the  information  of  the analog  data  part  of  the  transac-
tions.
3  Mining the analog data
Each transaction is characterized by symbolic and analog
data. So far we have only used the symbolic part of the
transactions. Does the analog part containing transaction
time, credit amount etc. provide any useful information?
Will it be possible to enhance the fraud diagnosis? Let us
first  consider  these  questions  for  separate  transactions
and then for a sequence of transactions of one account.
3.1  Diagnosing the data of one transaction
The problem of fraud diagnosis can be seen as separating
two  kinds  or  classes  of  events:  the  good  and  the  bad
transactions.  Our  problem  is  indeed  a  classification
problem. One major approach for dynamic classification
with demand driven classification boundaries is the ap-proach of learning the classification parameters, the clas-
sification boundaries, by an adaptive process. Learning is
the domain of artificial neural networks, and we used a
special model of it to perform the task.
3.1.1  The network
There  are  several  possible  network  approaches  for  the
task. For our model we used one expert neuron for each
feature group (time, money, etc) and grouped the experts
together to form a common vote. In Fig. 8 this architec-
ture is shown.
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Fig. 8 The neural network experts for analog data
We used several networks of the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) type [11], each one specialized on one topic.
One  net  consists  of  several  RBF  neurons  which  are
placed such as to minimize the output error. The super-
vised  training  of  each  net  was  done  sequentially.  The
number  of  units  in  the  first  (hidden)  layer  started  with
zero, adding a neuron each time the weight vector of the
neuron next to the input vector has the wrong class label
and the distance is bigger than the variance. Additionally,
even if the next neuron has the desired class label, a new
neuron is inserted if the distance is bigger than twice the
variance. To avoid too many neurons, a time out mecha-
nism deletes all neurons which are not activated within a
certain  “life  time”.  The  variance  is  updated  during  the
training.
If the input vector is within the reach of the neuron of
appropriate  class,  the  neurons  weights  are  updated  to
minimize the mean square error by a gradient descent. In
Fig. 9 the pseudo code for the network construction and
training is shown.
IF neuronVec.size()=0 THEN neuronVec.addNeuron
ENDIF
IF dist < minDist
  THEN
     IF desiredClass = Next.getNeuroClass()
       THEN
         IF 2*dist < minDist
           THEN  neuronVec.addNeuron()
           ELSE  Next.moveCenter(Input,Lrate)
                 Next.raiseWidth(Lrate)
          ENDIF
       ELSE
          neuronVec.addNeuron()
     ENDIF
  ELSE
     IF desiredClass = Next.getNeuroClass()
       THEN Next.raiseWidth(Lrate)
       ELSE Next.moveCenter(Input,-Lrate)
            Next.raiseWidth(-Lrate)
     ENDIF
ENDIF
Fig. 9 The algorithm for network construction
The second layer of each expert is a binary neuron, indi-
cating  fraud  or  not.  It  is  trained  by  the  Widrow-Hoff
learning rule [11].
The RBF nets encounter a severe problem in comparison
to  the  “sigma”  net  type,  simple  neurons  of  weighted
sums:  They  can  not  learn  the  differences  of  the  input
data. For instance, if we have the transaction date and the
card-creation date, the RBF neuron can be trained to be
sensitive to the difference of the two ( the time the card
was already in use), but only to the absolute  values  of
both.  This  problem  made  it  necessary  to  perform  pre-
processing operations like difference or quotient of vari-
ables to  get relative  data  which  can  be  compared  with
data of other transactions.
By this, we finally got seven input groups and therefore
seven nets with output {+1,–1} for {OK, FRAUD}.
3.1.2  The results
Because  we  have  a  very  low  fraud  occurrence  of  only
0.1%  the  simple  constant  diagnosis  “transactions  is  no
fraud”  will have  a  success  rate  of  99.9%.  To  compete
with this trivial diagnosis, the task of really diagnosing a
transaction is not easy to do. If we use only the analog
data, all transactions patterns characterized by n symbolic
and  m  analog  features  are  projected  from  the  n+m-
dimensional space into the m-dimensional space. Gener-
ally, this results in overlapping classes and therefore in
diagnostic success far worse than 99.9%. Thus, even us-
ing  adaptive  neural  networks,  we  have  no  chance:  the
diagnosis of analog data can only serve as an additional
information source, not as the main diagnostic criterion.
This principal idea may be underlined by an example.
We  trained  a  neural  network  as  shown  in  Fig.  8  with
equally distributed fraud and legal data by 100 training
cycles. The test for 100 test data showed that from the
500  fraud  data  464  (92.8%)  were  classified  as  “fraud”
whereas this is the case for 340 (68%) legal ones. Obvi-
ously, the good fraud diagnosis property is dominated bya high  false  alarm  rate  which  occurs  1000  times  more
often. This situation leads to a confidence of only Conf =
(5,626×0.928)  /  (5,626×0.928+5,626,000×0.68)  =  0.14%
which is unacceptable low; at least 10% is demanded. In
Fig. 10 the typical situation is shown for the separation of
two classes by one analog variable.
                 p(x|L) p(x|M)
1
   conf(x)
0 A B C        x
Fig. 10 Diagnosis for overlapping classes
Here, the two probability density functions p(x|M) for the
fraud data and p(x|L) for the legal data are shown. For the
best separation probability of the two clusters, the class
boundary is located at point B in Fig. 10 where both den-
sities are equal. For our two goals of high fraud detection
success and high confidence in the detection we encoun-
ter a trade-off: If we choose the boundary at point A we
get  a  high  fraud  discover  probability  and  a  low  confi-
dence (high false alarm rate) whereas for a high  confi-
dence we have to choose the class decision boundary at
point C with a smaller fraud discovery success. Note that
due to the high proportion of legal data in the data set the
confidence  drops  sharply  when,  changing  the  class
boundary, legal transactions are diagnosed as fraud.
All  training  procedures  which  settle  a  classification
boundary  have to reflect this basic property.
Now, let us diagnose one transaction by the means of
the neural network. For that purpose, we used the neural
expert  system  shown  in  Fig.  8  and  trained  it  with  our
fraud  data.  We  used  300  transactions  for  training  and
analyzed  the  state  of  the  whole  network  afterwards  by
presenting 250 legal and 250 fraud data. The proportion
of legal to fraud data for training was changed, causing
different diagnosing behavior. The results are shown in
Table 7.
correct diagnosis % faulty diagno-
sis %
pro-
por-
tion total legal fraud legal fraud
confi-
dence
%
2:1 78.8 95.2 62.4 4.8 37.6 1.3
3:1 78.2 98.4 58.4 1.6 41.6 3.5
4:1 58.2 99.6 16.8 0.4 83.2 4.0
5:1 52.5 99.2 6.0 0.8 94.0 0.7
10:1 50.0 100 0 0 100 100
Table 7 Shifting the class boundary
As we can see, by augmenting the number of legal trans-
actions in the training the class boundary shifts towards
point C in Fig. 10. Here, the confidence is high, but the
fraud discovery becomes zero.
3.2  Diagnosing  sequences of data
One of the most interesting topics is the question whether
the sequence of transactions of one account can be used
to detect fraud transactions. Here, two ideas evolve. First,
there can be typical fraud sequences, for instance the be-
havior of a thief after copying or picking the credit card.
Second, there can be a “typical” behavior of the user (a
“user profile”) which it does not correspond to the actual
transaction sequence may indicate a credit card misuse.
Can we detect one of these cases by appropriate means?
3.2.1  Symbolic user profile
To answer this question, we ordered our data in time for
each account. This revealed that most of the accounts had
less than 30 transactions as a sequence which is far too
small for good statistics.
Additionally,  the  analysis  of  the  symbolic  part  of  the
transaction data is demotivated by the fact that the inter-
esting features such as the merchant ID can take many
different values. Finding probable temporal sequences of
the symbolic states means learning the transaction prob-
ability between many states, e.g. 100,000. This needs not
only a vast amount of storage for the state transition ma-
trix of all possible states for each account, but also much
more transaction data to fill the matrix which we do not
have. Thus, a markov model for the state transitions is
out  of  reach  for  our  task.  Instead,  we  implemented  a
“preference  counter”:  For  a  time  window  of  several
transactions of one account the number of equal values of
a  symbolic  feature  is  counted.  Strong  preferences  of
symbolic values (“habitudes”) are reflected by this vari-
able.  For a  set  of  1000  sequences  of  length  3  (triples)
composed  by  50  fraud  associated  triples  and  50  legal
transaction triples the  probability  for  a  fraud  (or  legal)
transaction to be recognized when a triple of equal sym-
bolic values are shown in the columns of Table 8 for each
feature.Legal TA Fraud TA feature probability # probability #
TRN-NBR 0.48 24 0.98 49
CURR-CD 0.58 29 1.00 50
POS-ENT-CD 0.38 19 0.60 30
ICA-CD 0.72 36 0.52 26
AID-CD 0.42 21 0.52 26
SIC-CD 0.16 8 0.50 25
ACT-CD 0.96 48 0.92 46
MSG-TYP 0.56 28 1.00 50
MER-ID 0.02 1 0.32 16
Table 8  The occurrence of symbolic values in a
sequence of length 3
Since all  fraud  and  legal  transactions  are  rarely  recog-
nized by exclusive triples of equal feature values, the con-
fidence of fraud detection based on these probabilities is
very low, shown in the last two columns. Here again, the
dominance of legal transactions impedes a proper recog-
nition. Nevertheless, they constitute an additional source
of diagnostic information.
3.2.2  Analog user profile
For the sequences of analog values we used a neural net-
work, similar to the one of section  3.1.1.  As input,  we
considered n inputs for each analog feature, correspond-
ing to the n values of a window of n time steps. We con-
sider  the time  distance  between  the  transactions  by  in-
cluding  the  time  difference  as  additional  analog  input
variable.  By  this  approach,  we  hope  to  discover  fraud
behavior patterns like many high transaction amounts in a
short time interval. For processing, the analog features are
divided  by  the mean  values.  Additionally,  the  amounts
are divided by the time difference to get the cash flow of
the account as input.
3.2.3  Results of the combined approach
The  user  profile  diagnostic network  was  designed  as  a
combination of the symbolic and the analog subnets by a
threshold neuron. The network was trained by a mixture
of 200 fraud transactions and 200 legal ones. The output
was activated when the sum of the input superceded the
threshold. In turn, when a sequence occurred each input
line was activated and weighted by their fraud probabil-
ity. Thus, the activity as the sum of the marginal prob-
abilities reflected the probability conditions only roughly.
The probability of a correct diagnosis evolved to 0.7 in
the training process. The validation on a test set of 125
fraud  transactions  and  125  legal  ones  resulted  in  the
slightly smaller probability  of 0.65. Certainly,  these re-
sults depend on the sequence length n. In Table 9, this is
shown for different time window length.
correct diagnosis
n legal fraud total confidence
3 0.94 0.37 0.65 0.57 %
4 0.73 0.43 0.58 0.16 %
5 0.98 0.26 0.62 1.58 %
6 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.15 %
Table 9 Classification success of profile data
Here, the diagnosis heavily depends on the different in-
fluences. For short time windows,  the diagnostic influ-
ence of the tuples of symbolic data is bigger than the in-
fluence of the analog data. Increasing the window length
lowers the number of equal features and therefore its di-
agnostic influence until it reaches zero.
It  should  be  noted  that,  due  to  the  small  proportion
1:1000  of  fraud  data  the  resulting  confidence  is  deter-
mined again by the diagnostic success of the legal data.
4  Combining symbolic and analog infor-
mation
In the previous sections we encountered the fact that the
analog data of neither one nor several transactions of an
account can serve as a satisfying criterion for fraud diag-
nosis. Therefore, we have to combine the diagnostic in-
formation of the rule-based association system of section
2 with the expert information of section 3.
4.1  A hybrid expert architecture
There  are  several  possible  architectures  for  an  hybrid
diagnostic system. In Fig. 11 and in Fig. 12  two versions
are shown.
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Fig. 11 A parallel diagnosis
In Fig. 11, the diagnostic results are used in parallel. The
diagnostic  influence  of  all  the  experts  are  initially  the
same and converge by training in the limit to their appro-
priate  value.  In  all  situations,  decisions  based  on  the
analog data can override the rule based expert.fraud
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Fig. 12 A sequential diagnosis
The  second  architecture  in  Fig.  12  tries  to  avoid  this
situation.  From  the  beginning,  the  rule  based  system
dominates. Its diagnosis can be only corrected in the case
of a false fraud assignment. The sequential architecture
avoids  wrong  fraud  assignments  by  a  kind  of  logical
AND decision. Obviously, this will  optimize the  confi-
dence in fraud decisions, not the probability of fraud de-
tection.
4.2  Results
For a special test subset of 1000 transactions which are
selected  from  the  set  of  all  transactions  with  multiple
transactions per account we computed the rule-based di-
agnosis, the analog diagnosis  probabilities  and the  user
profile  diagnosis  probabilities  on  different  test  sets.  In
Table 10, the results are compared to the results of Table
6.
Correct
diagnosis
Legal TA Fraud TA total confi-
dence %
Rule based 1.00 0.802 0.901 100.00
0.9998 0.8308 0.9153 80.60
1:1000 0.99963 80.59
Analog 0.952 0.754 0.853 1.550
0.924 0.71 0.817 0.931
1:1000 0.92379 0.926
Profile 0.934 0.436 0.685 0.66
Table 10 Correct diagnosis of the rule based, the analog
data based and the profile based system for 1000 transac-
tions and 11700 transactions using 1:1 proportions. In
brackets the computed values for a 1:1000 proportion are
given.
The rules are selected according to a share of 80% giving
a set of 510 rules, approximately 10% of the number of
fraud transactions. In Table  10,  only  the  separate diag-
nostic  results  on  1000  transactions  are  shown.  For  the
profile data only a small amount of account history data
were available for training and analysis. Thus, all training
for  the  profiles  was  restricted to  300  samples,  i.e.  150
legal and 150 fraud data.
When we combine all diagnostic modules into a parallel
network  of  experts  (see  Fig.  11),  we  can  increase  the
fraud diagnosis benefits. This is shown in Table 11.
Diagnostic
method
P(correct
fraud diagn.)
Confidence
%
Data set size 1000 11,700 1000 11,700
Rules + analog .856 .879 100 1.048
Rules + profile .802 - 100 -
Analog + profile .752 - 3.04 -
All, Training 1:1 .848 - 12.38 -
All, Training 1:2 .812 - 100 -
All, Training 1:3 .796 - 100 -
Table 11Comparison of different parallel diagnostic expert
systems on two sets of data
Due to the small sample size of profiling data there was
no  profiling  diagnosis  available  for  the  sample  size  of
11,700.
Certainly, the training 1:1 with equal proportional fraud
and legal data does not reflect the real proportions well.
Changing the training sample properties to 1:2 or 1:3 (in-
stead of 1:1000) for the sample size of 1000 transactions,
we  get  different  diagnostic  probabilities  actions,  see
Table 11. As we already discussed before in section 3,
the  classification  probabilities  decrease  slightly  when
changing  the  training  proportions  from  1:1  to  1:2  and
finally to 1:3, but the confidence increases dramatically
from 12% up to 100% as shown in Fig. 10.
In the table above we notice that the rule based sys-
tem dominates by its unmatched diagnostic power. Using
the  additional  diagnostic  modules  results  in  a  smaller
fraud diagnosis probability and less confidence. So, in-
stead of augmenting the diagnostic  abilities  of  the rule
based system the analog and profile information spoil the
diagnostic process. How can we overcome this? If we use
the rule based system first and let the other experts diag-
nose its output, the result should be better.
Therefore, the sequential model of Fig. 12 promises a
better  fraud  detection  and  additional  confidence.  Cer-
tainly, this kind of system  does  not  decrease  the prob-
ability for the first stage to classify fraud data as “legal”,
but  it  should increase  the  probability  for  the  diagnosis
“fraud”  to  be  correct  and  therefore  increase  the  confi-
dence and decrease the number of false alarms.
Is this true? Let us regard the results for the sequential
combination of rules R, analog experts A and profile ex-
pert P, listed in Table 12.
diagnostic
method
P(correct
fraud diagn.)
confidence
%
data set size 1000 11,700 1000 11,700
510 R+A 0.69 0.75 100.0 81.5
747 R+A 0.80 0.82 28.6 49.0
837 R+A 0.82 0.84 29.0 62.1
510 R+A+P 0.85 – 100.0 –
747 R+A+P 0.87 – 100.0 –
837 R+A+P 0.95 – 100.0 –
Table 12 Comparing the performance of different sequen-
tial diagnostic expert systems on two sets of dataFor a training of 1:1 we measured the performance of
the sequential scheme. We can observe that the combined
power  of  rule  and  analog  expert  does  not  increase  the
amount of detected fraud, but detect it more securely with
100% confidence just as we expected. Nevertheless, the
probability of fraud detection is too low compared with
the rule based system only. Therefore, we tested the strat-
egy  of  adding  additional  rules  even  with  lower  confi-
dence. As we can see in Table 12, more rules give more
alarms which, filtered by the analog experts, increase the
probability  of  fraud  detection.  The  confidence  values
should be taken not literally but as a hint for the perform-
ance  of  the  scheme:  The  drop  of  100%  confidence  to
81.5% in the first row of the table is caused by just one
erroneously classified legal transaction.
In summary, by an automatically generated rule sys-
tem  we  managed  to  increase  the  correct  diagnosis  of
99.9% to 99.95 %. Including also the analog and profiling
information we increased this to 99.995%.
As  most  important  topic,  the  detection  of  fraud  is  in-
creased from 0% to 80% by using  the  generalized rule
system. Adding the analog information of the transactions
by training additional analog and profile expert modules
we succeeded to drive the fraud detection probability up
to 95% with the confidence of nearly 100%. Thus,  our
system promises to save 95% of the fraud, i.e. 9.5 million
dollars per year.
.
5  Discussion
In this contribution we developed concepts for the statis-
tic-based credit card fraud diagnosis. We showed that this
task has to be based on the very special diagnostic situa-
tion imposed by the very small proportion of  fraud data
of 1:1000.
We showed that a naive association memory approach
for the symbolic features of the transaction data has se-
vere implementation problems which can be overcome by
treating all transactions as generalized rules of level 0. By
algorithmically generalizing these rules we obtain higher
levels  of  diagnostic  rules.  The  high  intrinsic  run-time
complexity of this process can not be applied to the whole
data base. Instead, representative sample sizes had been
chosen and the partial results have been validated on the
whole data set.
Additionally, the analog transaction data can be analyzed
by  specially  designed  neural  networks.  However,  the
good results produce too many false alarms giving  bad
diagnostic confidence. Also the user habits (user profile)
can produce valid fraud information, but  the  associated
confidence is not sufficient.
Finally,  we  discussed  the  concept  of  combining all  the
diagnostic  information  into  one  adaptive  multi-expert
system.  This  concept  can  improve  both  the  confidence
and the diagnostic probability.
In  summary,  combining  rule-based  information  and
adaptive classification methods yields good results, even
in the case of  the very difficult analysis of credit card
fraud detection. Additional work is necessary to design
an  online  learning  and  diagnostic  system  based  on  the
results.
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Share, Confidence and Generalization
Theorem 1
For a generalization of n rules the share Sres of the result-
ing rule has as least the maximum of the share of all the
rules
Sres >  max {S1, ..., Sn}
Proof
Let us consider the case of two rules. Their share is by eq.
(2.5)
Si = ai/b
with  ai = #fraud transactions covered by rule i
and    b = #fraud transactions
The new rule covers all the transactions of the base rules
ares >  max {a1, ..., an}
such that we get
Sres = ares/b >  max {a1/b, ..., an/b} = max {S1, ..., Sn}
ð
Remarks
In the best case, the new rule covers only non-intersecting
transaction sets
Sres =  å
=
n
1 i
i S
When several, but not all values of a feature are replaced
by one wildcard, the share can become even bigger .
Sres >  å
=
n
1 i
i S
Theorem 2
For a generalization of n rules the confidence Cres of the
resulting rule has as at most the maximum of the confi-
dences all the rules
Cres £  max {C1, ..., Cn}
Proof
Let us consider the case of two rules. Their confidences
are after (2.6)
C1 = 
1
1
b
a
    and   C2 = 
2
2
b
a
= 
1
1
b
a
b
a
with a,b >0 and Cres = 
2 1
2 1
b b
a a
+
+
.
Let us assume C1³C2. Then, we have a£b and therefore
a £ b Û  1+a £ 1+b Û 
b +
a +
1
1
£ 1 
Û 
b ) 1 (
a ) 1 (
b +
a +
£ 
o 1 Û  Cres = 
2 1
2 1
b b
a a
+
+
£ 
o 1  
This can be easily generalized to three rules by general-
izing the resulting rule with the third rule, the result with
the forth rule and so on. Therefore, this is also valid for n
rules and the resulting confidence is lower or equal than
the maximum of all the rules.
ð
For the share of a generalized rule, we have a comple-
mentary result.